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This paper is principally concerned with reappraising some of the major disagreements
that separated the Viennese and the London Kleinians during the British Psychoanalytical
Society’s Controversial Discussions. Of particular focus are questions pertaining to
the genesis of ego development, the beginnings of object-relating, and the role of
unconscious phantasy in respect of these phenomena. The aim of the investigation is
to inquire into the light that may be shed on the once intractable conflicts surrounding
these questions by bringing to bear more recent developments from psychoanalysis
and the neurosciences. First, various key issues from the Controversial Discussions
are outlined, before the paper turns to work by Jaak Panksepp and Mark Solms that
bears on these older arguments and the Freudian theories that underpinned them. With
these conceptual foundations established, three questions are posed and discussed
with a view to understanding the implications of recent neuropsychoanalytic thinking
for some of the entrenched conflicts that divided the British Society. These questions
include: (1) what does it mean for the ego if the id is conscious? (2) What does recent
neuroscientific knowledge tell us about whether the ego should be thought of as present
from birth? (3) How can we understand and locate unconscious phantasy if the main part
of the mind that Freud thought of as unconscious is not so? Research from the arena
of infant development—particularly the material and analysis of infant observation—is
drawn on to illustrate various conclusions. The paper ultimately concludes that taking
such an interdisciplinary approach can reveal renewed justification for aspects of the
Kleinian metapsychology.
Keywords: psychoanalysis, neuropsychoanalysis, controversial discussions, infant development, unconscious
phantasy, object relations, ego development
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INTRODUCTION: AN UNCIVIL WAR1
Between 1942 and 1944, in the wake of Sigmund Freud’s death
and with the world at war for the second time that century,
the British Psychoanalytical Society was engaged in what is
widely regarded as the most attritional debate in its history
(Rycroft, 1968, p. 27). Dubbed the “Controversial Discussions,”
the period played host to series of scientific meetings that were
organised in the attempt to resolve conflicting views that different
Society members held with respect to fundamental aspects of the
psychoanalytic model of the mind. On one side of the divide
stood the Viennese, comprised of Anna Freud and her followers,
whilst on the other was a group of psychoanalysts loyal to
Melanie Klein (Rycroft, 1968, p. 28). Despite the Controversial
Discussions ultimately resulting in what may most appropriately
be described as an agreement to disagree, their impact would
shape British psychoanalysis for decades to come. Not only did
the Discussions lead to the creation of a hitherto undefined
“Middle Group,” they also necessitated significant changes to the
Society’s training programmewhichwas reorganised to reflect the
theoretical and technical divisions that had proved impossible to
reconcile (King and Steiner, 1991, p. 25).
An important locus of the dispute between the Viennese and
the Kleinians centred on questions pertaining to “the nature and
function of phantasy” (Isaacs, 1948, p. 73). As stated by King
and Steiner (1991, p. 242)—authors of the definitive account
of the Controversial Discussions—“the notion of unconscious
phantasy [. . . ] is probably the major theoretical theme of all
the Scientific Discussions.” The different positions taken on
this subject revealed deep divides within the British Society
and led to radically divergent conclusions being drawn with
respect to a broad range of psychological phenomena. A chief
area of contention that ran parallel to the different conceptions
of phantasy concerned the genesis of ego development. It was
specifically on the question of whether the ego is present from
birth that some of the Discussions’ most stubborn disagreements
were centred.
It is with these same themes that this paper is concerned.
The aim of this investigation will be to inquire into how these
once intractable conflicts may be reappraised by bringing to
bear more recent developments from within psychoanalysis as
well as from the neurosciences; an interdisciplinary emphasis
that is closely compatible with the Frontiers Research Topic
for which this paper has been produced. An outline of some
of the key issues from the Controversial Discussions will be
presented, before a review of theoretical literature by Jaak
Panksepp and Mark Solms is addressed; work that influences
contemporary understandings of these older arguments and the
Freudian theories that underpinned them. This review of current
interdisciplinary developments represents a key purpose of the
present paper. With these conceptual foundations established,
three questions are posed and discussed. The aim of this second
1The name given to a BBC documentary covering the Brexit referendum, which
saw the emergence of profound splits in British society. Appropriated in this
instance in respect of the profound splits that emerged within the British
Psychoanalytical Society in the 1940s.
half of the paper is to explore the implications of recent
developments from the neuropsychoanalytic domain for some of
the entrenched conflicts that divided the different cohorts within
the British Society. Infant development research—particularly
material and analysis derived from infant observation—is drawn
on to give body to various conclusions.
CONTROVERSIAL DISCUSSIONS
CONCERNING THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE
For the Viennese, it was fundamentally incorrect to suggest that
the ego—the intrapsychic agency that Freud (1914, p. 7) had first
described as “das Ich”– is present from birth. Claiming allegiance
to Freud’s original theories, Anna Freud proposed that at the
very beginning of life “no ego exists” (King and Steiner, 1991,
p. 420). Instead, the infant is said to be born into a state of
“primary narcissism” that is characterised, in the Viennese view,
as an “auto-erotic” phase that extends over the first months of
life. Crucially, during this time, the infant is described as having
“no object relation in the proper sense” (King and Steiner, 1991,
p. 753–754, my emphasis). Rather, it is argued that the infant
spends their opening months seeking only “themselves as a love-
object,” to quote Sigmund Freud’s paper On Narcissism (1914, p.
88). Moreover, as Freud (1914, p. 100) would go on to state in
that influential paper, “the development of the ego consists in a
departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous
attempt to recover that state.” In other words—and as was at the
very crux of the arguments put forward by Anna Freud and her
followers—a basic mutual exclusivity exists between the presence
of primary narcissism and the existence of an ego that can relate
to objects “in the proper sense,” such that the latter is conditional
on the suspension of the former.
For the Kleinians, this perspective constituted an essential
misunderstanding of the infantile psyche. What’s more, rather
than following Freud, it was contended that the Viennese Group’s
proposals in fact amounted to “a distortion” of his views
(King and Steiner, 1991, p. 244). In contrast to Anna Freud’s
position, the Kleinians affirmed that the ego does exist from
birth; indeed, they suggested that its “considerable capacities”
can be observed from the very start of life (Bott Spillius
et al., 2011, p. 319). Amongst these capacities is said to be
“a pre-existing knowledge of the breast and of the mother”
on which and whom the child depends (Bott Spillius et al.,
2011, p. 319–320). In the Kleinian schema, the expression of
this inherited relational knowledge is mediated by phantasy,
which in Thomas Ogden’s terse description, can be defined as
the “psychic representation of instinct” (Ogden, 1984, p. 501).
Accordingly, phantasy—the psychological “corollary” of our
innate biological instincts—is conceptualised as accompanying
all mental activity from the very beginning of life (Bott Spillius
et al., 2011, p. 3–4). In the view of Klein herself, as the ego-
equipped infant navigates its primordial experience and forges
burgeoning relationships with its primary objects, its phantasy
is said to be governed by the primal mechanisms of “projection
and introjection” (Bott Spillius et al., 2011, p. 320). The resultant
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flow of psychical qualities and quantities that these mechanisms
engender represents mental activity that, through the Kleinian
lens, co-occurs with the rudimentary ego’s oscillation “between
states of integration and disintegration” (Klein, 1946, p. 179–
180). Consequently, phantasy and ego are regarded as intimately
connected: specifically, the presence of phantasy is understood as
having a cognate co-existence with “das Ich.”
With the establishment of these basic theoretical tenets, it
became impossible for the Kleinians to maintain that a phase of
proper primary narcissism and auto-erotism exists in the baby
during the first months of life (King and Steiner, 1991, p. 253).
To be clear, it was not that the Kleinians saw narcissism per se as
an invalid concept. Rather, they argued that narcissism represents
a defensive withdrawal to an idealised internal object and thus
can only be conceived of as secondary (King and Steiner, 1991, p.
253). For the Viennese, it proved similarly impossible to “accept
the notion of unconscious phantasy” in regard to the infant’s first
days, as to do so would be to imply the existence an early ego
(King and Steiner, 1991, p. 243). For those that participated in
the Discussions, this impasse was largely irreconcilable. Perhaps
the closest that the two groups came to agreement is evidenced
in Anna Freud’s admission that the “synthetic function of the
ego”—by which she is referring to “the synthesis of perception
and reality-testing”—is “achieved in degrees from birth onwards”
(King and Steiner, 1991, p. 420). Nonetheless, she would go on to
state that “it would not be accurate to say that this is achieved by
the ego,” but rather that this “synthetic function builds the ego
or constitutes the first ego-nucleus” (King and Steiner, 1991, p.
420, my emphasis). In Anna Freud’s consistent view, it was not
until “six months of age” that an ego-nucleus could be said to
have developed into an ego structure capable of object relating
(King and Steiner, 1991, p. 754).
PANKSEPP’S CONTRIBUTION FROM AN
ADJACENT DOMAIN
In the middle of these Controversial Discussions—in June
1943—a child was born in Estonia, who, later in life, would
transform our understanding of the emotions through a
string of neuroscientific discoveries. Named Jaak Panksepp, the
discoveries he made can arguably make a profound contribution
to our retrospective appraisal of the disagreements that divided
the British Psychoanalytical Society at the time of his birth.
Given their import, these discoveries are worth briefly sketching
out. At the centre of Panksepp’s contribution lies his work
on the basic emotion systems: “consciousness-creating affective
circuits” that are “concentrated in subcortical regions” (Panksepp
and Biven, 2012, p. 1). Taken together, these evolutionarily
ancient subcortical regions of the brain comprise “at least
seven emotional, or affective, systems”: “SEEKING (expectancy),
FEAR (anxiety), LUST (sexual excitement), CARE (nurturance),
PANIC/GRIEF (sadness), and PLAY (social joy)” (Panksepp and
Biven, 2012, p. 2).” For Solms (2018, p. 5)—neuroscientist,
psychoanalyst and long-standing collaborator of Panksepp’s—
these are “the drives” of traditional psychoanalysis, albeit re-
imagined and refined. Crucially, unlike the homeostatic drives
which compel us to seek, amongst other things, sleep, sustenance
and thermal regulation, the basic emotion systems outlined here
constitute relational drives, the satisfaction of which routinely
depends on objects (in the psychoanalytic sense) (Solms, 2018,
p. 5). In short, to feel the affects generated by these neurological
systems is to experience a sense of how one’s basic emotional
needs may or may not be being met (Solms, 2018, p. 5). Indeed,
that, for affective neuroscientists, is the primary function of
feeling: to tell you “how you are doing in relation to your
biological needs” (Solms, 2021, p. 96).
It is this array of subcortical systems that, according to
Panksepp and Biven (2012, p. 13), creates an “energetic form of
consciousness”—what is also referred to as “core consciousness”
(Damasio, 2000, p. 82)—that is full of raw affective intensity. Put
simply, it feels good or bad—pleasurable or unpleasurable—to
experience the consciousness that these systems create (Solms,
2021, p. 96). This leads to a conclusion with radical implications,
not least because it clearly not only applies to humans: for
an organism to be feeling the status of its biological needs
at any given moment necessarily implies the presence of core
consciousness. As Panksepp dedicated much of his working life
to investigating, such “affective consciousness” (Panksepp and
Biven, 2012, p. 2) can be generated using deep brain stimulation
techniques that target the seven basic systems (Panksepp, 2010, p.
536). Moreover, this experimental method can reliably produce
expected behavioural responses. For example, an organism
experiencing the activation of their SEEKING system will exhibit
foraging behaviours; if the FEAR system is activated, a fright
or flight response will predominate etc. (Panksepp, 2010, p.
536–537). And whilst it cannot be claimed that the seven basic
emotions, on their own, encapsulate the extensive nuance of
human feeling, they are said to underlie that vast richness. For
Panksepp, this narrow range of systems represent the primary
sources of our emotional life. The great variety of “secondary”
emotions that we experience are generated, it is argued, through
“complex cognitive-affective amalgams” (Panksepp and Watt,
2011, p. 10) of the basic emotions that lie at the “deepest roots
of the human mind” (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p. 5), analogous
to the way in which the full spectrum of colour may be created
through mixing various quantities of red, yellow, and blue.
SOLMS’ PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC LENS
Amongst the most established of psychoanalytic theories to have
been shaken by the identification of the basic emotions relates to
a framework that both the Viennese and the Kleinians stated their
allegiance to: Freud’s structural model of the mind. First detailed
in the 1923 paper The Ego and the Id, the structural model
represented Freud’s proposal that the personality is comprised of
three psychic agencies: the id, the superego, and as was so keenly
debated during the Discussions, the ego. This structural model
constituted an expansion of Freud’s original model of the mind—
the topographical model—which he had introduced in 1900 as
a way of mapping the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious
psychological domains (Boag, 2017). Importantly, the structural
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model of 1923 did not operate as a replacement for Freud’s
topographical account; rather, the two theoretical frameworks
are more accurately viewed as describing different dimensions
of the human mind, analogous to the way in which a body of
water can be understood in distinct yet mutually inclusive ways:
in one sense, we might consider its depth-related hydrostatic
pressure; in another, we can attend to its molecular structure.
Correspondingly, the components of Freud’s structural model
may be compatibly located within—and across—the various
topographical layers of the psyche.
Of all the components within the structural model, it is
perhaps Freud’s conceptualisation of the id that has undergone
the most dramatic reappraisal due to Panksepp’s discoveries
(Solms, 2013, p. 5). For Freud (1938, p. 145), the id was described
as the part of the mind that contains “the instincts, which
originate from the somatic organization.” As is unambiguously
stated in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, “the id obeys the
inexorable pleasure principle”: it is despotically governed by
“feelings of pleasure-unpleasure” (Freud, 1938, p. 198).
As may be apparent, the Freudian id thus bears the some of
the same core properties as Panksepp’s basic emotion systems:
both are described as the source of the instincts and both are
governed by the pursuit of satisfying pleasure (Solms, 2013, p. 7).
Where the similarity between the id and the basic emotions ends
however is in the fact that the id is located by (Freud, 1923, p.
24) within the system unconscious. For affective neuroscientists,
the basic emotion systems are understood in wholly opposite
terms.Whilst these basic affects are also described as instinctually
directing the organism through “feelings of pleasure-unpleasure,”
they are far from being unconscious; indeed, they have been
shown by Panksepp to be “the font of all consciousness”
(Solms and Panksepp, 2012, p. 174), my emphasis). This
conflict is only resolved, Solms and Panksepp (2012, p. 174)
suggest, if we are willing to reconceptualise the Freudian id as
essentially conscious. Not only does this challenge one of the
bedrocks of psychoanalysis, it also upturns one of the theoretical
foundations that the Viennese and the Kleinians agreed upon.
Arguably however, rather than debunking the structural model
entirely, Solms (2019) suggests that Freud may have simply
got it, figuratively speaking, “upside-down,” a view that implies
the model may still represent an invaluable organisation of
psychological phenomena, notwithstanding the re-orientations
that it may require.
TOWARDS A BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR
PSYCHOANALYTIC METAPSYCHOLOGY
As affective neuroscientists have demonstrated over recent
decades, the basic emotion systems that underpin Solms
and Panksepp’s recalibration of psychoanalytic metapsychology
each have “a distinct brain anatomy, neuropharmacology, and
physiology” (Davis andMontag, 2019, p. 2). For an encyclopaedic
account of this detail, The Archaeology of Mind (Panksepp
and Biven, 2012) represents an authoritative source. Whilst a
full description of this biology and chemistry lies outside the
scope of the present paper, a basic overview is nonetheless
warranted. Indeed, one of the most significant implications
of these discoveries relates to the brain’s anatomy and how
we understand the functional contributions of different brain
regions. As Panksepp and Biven write:
“the basic biological values of all mammalian brains were built
upon the same basic plan, laid out in consciousness-creating
affective circuits that are concentrated in subcortical regions, far
below the neocortical ‘thinking cap’ that is so highly developed in
humans.” (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p. 1)
This statement is radical for numerous reasons. Not only does
it invite a re-evaluation of man’s place in nature and broach
what has enigmatically been called “the final frontier” of science:
consciousness itself (Gunamuktananda, 2014), it also poses a
specific challenge to conventional wisdom within brain science
and beyond. As Solms (2013, p. 9) notes, Panksepp’s proposal
exposes “the corticocentric fallacy”: the long-held notion that
“the ‘seat’ of consciousness is in the cerebral cortex,” to quote
Freud who also ascribed to this view (Freud, quoted in Solms,
2013, p. 9). For Panksepp and colleagues however, decades of
inquiry strongly suggest that “the seat” of consciousness is in
fact situated, anatomically speaking, “far below” the cortical brain
regions (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p. 1).
Powerful evidence for this claim is provided from various
sources, perhaps none of which are more compelling than
the cases of hydranencephalic children documented by Merker
(2007). As Davis and Montag (2019, p. 3) write, such children –
who are born without a “neocortical ‘thinking cap’,” and yet who
are highly emotional in ways that are “situationally appropriate” –
unambiguously show that emotional responses, even in humans,
“do not require the participation of the neocortex.” If the cerebral
cortex does not then play an integral role in the generation of
emotion, which subcortical brain structures do? In Panksepp’s
(2010, p. 535) words:
The primary-process networks for emotional instincts run
from midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG) regions to medial
diencephalon to various basal ganglia nuclei (amygdala, bed
nucleus of the stria terminalis, nucleus accumbens, etc.) that
interact with paleocortical brain functions (e.g., cingulate, insular,
as well as medial- and orbitofrontal cortices) and more indirectly
with certain neocortical regions to provide integration with higher
cognitive activities.
Due to the “striking cross-species homologies” that exist with
respect to the more ancient primary-process neural regions,
affective neuroscientists have been able to study many of these
regions in animal subjects as a means of deriving insights
into the human brain (Panksepp, 2010, p. 534). A crucial
discovery to have emerged from such investigations concerns
the central role played by the periaqueductal grey (PAG): the
structure that is the “terminus of every affect circuit” (Solms,
2020, p. 14), “the genesis of every newly felt affect” (Solms,
2020, p. 14), and that’s “common” significance to all affective
systems has been corroborated in meta-analyses (Buhle et al.,
2013; Motta et al., 2017; Gammon, 2020, p. 198). As Solms
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writes in his 2021 volume, The Hidden Spring, when describing
this structure:
“[The PAG] divides into two groups of functional columns. One of
them, the back one [dorsal] [. . . ] is where the FEAR, RAGE and
PANIC/GRIEF systems terminate. The front one [lateral] [is where]
[. . . ] the LUST, CARE and SEEKING circuits terminate” (2021,
p. 137).
As such, the PAG can be seen to play a vital part in generating the
very feelings of pleasure and unpleasure that are outputted by the
brain’s consciousness-creating affective circuits and that define
the re-conceptualised id. This said, as Kunstadt (2013, p. 56, my
emphasis) observes, it would not be accurate to state therefore
that “consciousness resides in the PAG” and that this structure
alone represents the “neural correlate of consciousness” (Koch
et al., 2016). Indeed, correlating consciousness in a localised
manner with the PAG runs counter to many of the compelling
arguments put forward by embodied cognition theorists who
emphasise the importance of the whole body—not just the
brain—in the biology of emotion (e.g., Antonio Damasio’s
Somatic Marker Hypothesis and Stephen Porges’ Polyvagal
Theory) (Hemp et al., 2014). There is, however, good evidence
to suggest that when it comes to the networked generation
consciousness, the PAG functions as a crucial “nodal point”: it is,
as Solms (2013, p. 12) states, the “smallest region of brain tissue
in which damage leads to total obliteration of consciousness,”
(something that is not observed in the aforementioned cases
of hyranencephaly). In the same sense, whilst it would not be
meaningful to exclusively correlate the id with this localised brain
structure, it could be argued that the PAG is centrally implicated
in the mental functioning associated with the id.
BEHAVIOURIST CRITICISM OF THE
INTERDISCIPLINARY PROJECT
Critiques of the views hitherto explored—particularly of
psychoanalytic ideas—have been widely documented, both
within and outwith the psychological and brain sciences. Perhaps
the most influential and sustained criticism has been levelled
by behavioural psychologists such as B.F. Skinner. Claimed
by Haggbloom et al. (2002) to have been “the most eminent
psychologist of the twentieth century,” Skinner was one of the
founders of behaviourism, which, over the course of last century,
came to dominate the discipline of psychology. A consistent
position taken by Skinner (1950, p. 193) was to be critical of
“any explanation of an observed fact which appeals to events
taking place somewhere else, at some other level of observation,
described in different terms, and measured, if at all, in different
dimensions.” As Zilio (2016, p. 202) explains, a problematic
theory would thus be one “that attempts to explain behaviour
by describing events that are not part of the behavioural relation
such as physiological and mental events.” Accordingly, both
neuroscience and psychoanalysis have come in for criticism.
For Skinner, the notion that expressed behaviour may be
“explained” by detailing, for example, the functioning of the
basic emotion systems, would be fundamentally flawed; because
such phenomena occur “in different dimensions,” the “radical
behaviourist” (Naour, 2009) view suggests that a different “level
of observation” (Skinner, 1950, p. 193) is necessarily required.
Through applying this logic, Skinner argued that many
within the psychological and brain sciences—including Freud
himself—proposed the existence of an “identity relation” between
conceptual models derived from the distinct phenomena of
behaviour and neurological functioning, simply as a means of
avoiding the “accusation of dualism” (the theory that the mental
and the physical—or mind and brain—“are, in some sense,
radically different kinds of thing” (Zilio, 2016, p. 204; Robinson,
2020). As Skinner wrote in 1983:
A touch of physiology seems to save them [cognitive psychologists]
from dualism, and many of them use ‘brain’ and ‘mind’
interchangeably. Freud took a similar position much earlier. He
assumed that we should some day know what the ego, superego,
and id, the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and all the
dynamisms really were in neurological terms (Skinner, 1983, p. 10).
The argument here is that by accepting such “identity relations”
as valid, we grant ourselves carte blanche to propose hypothetical
models of mental processes inferred from behaviour without
any concern about validation and parsimony (Zilio, 2016, p.
204–205). To proceed in such a fashion would, it is alleged, be
deeply unscientific.
Whilst it is indeed true that a core aspect of the
neuro-psychoanalytic endeavour is to build conceptual bridges
between the neurosciences and psychoanalysis, it is also true
that this project fundamentally aims at establishing more
scientifically robust levels of validation through “mutually
enriching dialogue” (Yovell et al., 2015), not less. The chief goal
of neuropsychoanalysis is, after all, to facilitate the triangulation
of discoveries made within interfacing disciplines that all pertain,
as Solms (2014) states, to “the same part of nature.” By the same
token, such triangulation can enable disproven hypotheses to be
rejected; a vital cornerstone of the objective scientific method.
This very ambition is what underpins the present paper. The
principal research question for this conceptual analysis is thus:
through engaging in an interdisciplinary dialogue and learning
lessons from contemporary neuroscience, what re-envisioned
shape does psychoanalytic metapsychology take? How, to borrow
a term from anthropology, can we arrive at a “thick description”
(Geertz, 1973, p. 3) of the psyche by expanding our horizons and
incorporating new neuroscientific dimensions to develop ameta-
neuro-psychological “way of seeing” (Berger, 1972)? Specifically,
which of the explanations put forward by the Viennese and
the Kleinians during the Controversial Discussions may now be
regarded as having the more solid scientific justification?
DISCUSSION: EMERGENT QUESTIONS
Innumerable questions emerge from Solms’ neuropsychoanalytic
re-orientation of Freud’s structural model. To cite but a few of
them: what does it mean for the ego if the id is conscious? What
does recent neuroscientific knowledge tell us about whether the
ego should be thought of as present from birth? And not least,
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how can we understand and locate unconscious phantasy if the
main part of the mind that Freud thought of as unconscious is
not so? There are, of course, many more questions that arise in
addition to these, however for the purposes and scope of this
paper, it is these that will be taken in turn.
What Does It Mean for the Ego if the Id Is
Conscious?
As for the first of these questions, a similarly radical revaluation
of traditional psychoanalytic perspectives may be warranted. For
Freud (1923, p. 17–23), the ego was defined as “the coherent
organization of mental processes” present in each individual
that “seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear
upon the id” and its incomparably passionate tendencies. Put
succinctly, it is the mental representative of external reality
(Freud, 1923, p. 36). Crucially, this representative function
inextricably links the ego with the body: the flesh and bone
that occupies time and space as an object in external reality.
As Freud (1923, p. 26) memorably encapsulated it, “the ego
is first and foremost a bodily ego; it is not merely a surface
entity, but is itself the projection of a surface.” Correspondingly,
the ego may thus be conceived of primarily as the body’s re-
presentation within the mind. Moreover—and central to this
discussion—the ego was thought by Freud (1923, p. 17–19)
to have an important (although not exclusive) relationship to
consciousness. As he writes in The Ego and the Id when first
introducing the “mental agency” of “das Ich,” “it is to this ego that
consciousness is attached” (Freud, 1923, p. 17–19). And whilst
it is important to acknowledge that, in Freud’s (1923, p. 19–24)
view, parts of the ego—for example “the repressed” aspects—
“can be unconscious,” it was only the id that was described by him
as essentially and exclusively “unknown and unconscious.” By
contrast, the ego, more so than any of the other psychic agencies
that entered psychoanalytic parlance in 1923, was what Freud
linked with consciousness.
Returning to the neuropsychoanalytic notion that the
structural model may benefit from being upended, the
implications for the ego are perhaps predictable. According
to Solms and Panksepp (2012 p. 174, my emphasis) the mental
functioning that is considered synonymous with the Freudian
ego is, contrary to the conventional view, “unconscious in itself.”
The variety of mental functioning being referred to here is what
Solms (2013, p. 16), in his paper The Conscious Id, explicitly
links with “the external self ”: the “learnt representation”
of the body within the mind. For Solms (2013, p. 16), this
ideational “external self ”—this ego—is intimately connected
to the perceptual and representational level of experience that
confers a sense of our existence as an object amongst objects.
The ego is thus said to enable the ability to go beyond just
feeling (as is synonymous with the Freudian id), to “feeling
this about that” (where “that” is an object of perception)
(Solms and Panksepp, 2012, p. 168; Solms, 2013, p. 16).
This contextualising objectification of feeling goes to the very
heart of the ego’s relationship with the id: the former is said to
stabilise the latter’s core consciousness by “transforming affects
into object representations” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012, p. 174).
A crucial dynamic to note here is that this transformation process
is galvanised by affect. Without an affective stimulus from the
id, the ego would have nothing to declare and therein could
not be described as conscious. It is for this reason that the ego
is argued to be “unconscious in itself ”; the ego relies on the
output of the id’s affective circuits “from their origin in some
of the most ancient strata of the brain” for its irrigation and
so that the “dead soil” of its unconscious representations may
be brought “to mental life” (Solms, 2021, p. 91). Incomplete
accounts of this subtle but important distinction are arguably why
consciousness has frequently been associated with the ego, not
least by Freud himself.
For Solms and Panksepp (2012, p. 173), the level of
experience conferred by the ego—i.e., the sense of self as an
object that “feels this about that”—is described as “second-
person perspective.” Such a perspective can be conceptually
located between a “lower” viscerally affective “first-person
perspective” that just feels (as has been considered as closely
related to a conscious id), and a “higher” re-representational
“third-person perspective” that enables the reflexive capacity
to perceive the self from an external perspective (Solms and
Panksepp, 2012, p. 173–174; Solms, 2013, p. 16). This “multi-
tiered” framework of primary, secondary and tertiary levels
of experience is, for Solms and Panksepp (2012, p. 145) a
structural parsing of consciousness that closely echoes the
philosophy of Endel Tulving. In Tulving’s (1985, p. 1) view,
consciousness proceeds from the “lowest” anoetic level, through
the noetic level, to the “highest” autonoetic level. Put briefly—
and in a manner that aligns with Solms and Panksepp’s (2012,
p. 145–146) tripartite structure—anoetic consciousness refers
to unthinking forms of experience which may be affectively
intense without being “known”; noetic experience is linked to
exteroceptive perception and cognition; autonoetic experience
refers to abstracted forms of perceptions and cognitions, which
facilitate conscious “awareness” and reflection.
As Panksepp’s work has shown, anoetic consciousness is
something that evidence suggests is experienced across much
of the animal kingdom (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p. 1). By
contrast, autonoetic consciousness is a much rarer phenomenon
that, even within humans, is not said to be exhibited “before
the age of four” (Vandekerckhove, 2009, p. 9). This brings
us to a crucial point towards which this paper has been
converging: the different theoretical positions in respect of the
ego that the Viennese and the Kleinians espoused during the
Controversial Discussions may be seen to relate to different levels
of consciousness. In the Kleinian view, a “lower” point in Tulving’s
hierarchy would indicate early ego functioning. For Anna Freud
and her followers, something categorically more advanced in this
hierarchy would be necessary to claim the existence of an ego.
Crucially, if we accept Freud’s (1923, p. 36) notion that “the ego
is essentially the representative of the external world,” then a level
of consciousness that incorporates the capacity for exteroceptive
perception is a pre-requisite for the ego’s existence. Accordingly,
the question about the genesis of ego-presence might thus be
recast as a question about the point at which a nascent second-
person perspective, however rudimentary, first introduces the
object-relational capacity to “feel this about that.”
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What Does Recent Neuroscientific
Knowledge Tell Us About Whether the Ego
Should Be Thought of as Present From
Birth?
In their 2012 paper The Id Knows More Than the Ego Admits,
Solms and Panksepp elaborate on the second Tulvingian level
of consciousness—the noetic level—and introduce a further
concept that appears to equate this with a type of memory
which has a specific aetiology that can be dated to certain
points in infancy. The type of memory introduced is that of the
“declarative” category; they write “the ‘declarative’ noetic self ” is
what can be regarded as “synonymous with Freud’s ‘ego”’ and
“unconscious in itself ” (Solms and Panksepp, 2012, p. 174). It
is worth unpacking the implications of this equivalence as they
bear on the disagreements of the Controversial Discussions with
some significance.
Declarative memory is defined as a type of long-term memory
(as opposed to short-term “working memory”) that “requires
conscious recollection and includes the recognition and recall
of names, objects, and events” (Bauer and Pathman, 2020, p. 1).
In the literature, it is interchangeably referred to as “declarative”
and “explicit” memory. Recent research investigating infant
behaviour on non-verbal, imitation-based tasks has shown that
this type ofmemory is apparent in the first year of life; specifically,
even 6-month-olds appear able to remember actions for 24 (but
not 48) hours (Bauer and Pathman, 2020, p. 2). During the
months that follow, this recall timeframe expands exponentially:
9-month-olds appear to be able to remember actions for 1month,
and by 20 months of age, infants can remember for as long
as 1 year (Bauer and Pathman, 2020, p. 1). If therefore it is
appropriate to associate declarative memory with ego function,
it would suggest that the Viennese view whereby the ego is not
present until “6 months of age” (King and Steiner, 1991, p. 754)
may represent the more accurate account of infant development.
However, as has been shown by cognitive neuroscientists,
declarative memory is not the only type of long-term memory
that humans are equipped with: non-declarative (or “implicit”)
memory represents another form. This second type of long-
term memory is defined as inaccessible to conscious awareness
and includes “skill learning,” “emotional learning,” and “priming”
(i.e., facilitated processing of a stimulus—such as a mother’s
face—as a function of prior experience with it) (Bauer and
Pathman, 2020, p. 1; Squire and Dede, 2015, p. 3). Crucially, the
latest infant development research indicates that non-declarative
memory is apparent “virtually from birth,” a finding evidenced
by how infants show more robust processing of faces they have
perceived before relative to novel faces (Bauer and Pathman,
2020, p. 1, my emphasis). If it is legitimate to entertain a broader
classification of mnemonic function as indicative of the ego—
specifically if the operation of declarative memory and non-
declarative memory can both be conceptualised as ego functions
(albeit involving different levels of sophistication)—then the
Kleinian position is given significant credence.
Interestingly, close inspection of two of Solms’ papers
referenced above—The Id Knows More Than the Ego Admits
(2012) (co-authored with Panksepp), and The Conscious Id
(2013), which represents a “substantially revised version” (2012,
p. 143) of the 2012 paper—reveals that reference to the
“declarative self ” undergoes conspicuous amendment; usage of
this term when stating the “major conclusion” in respect of the
ego’s unconscious status, whilst present in 2012, is dropped in the
2013 paper in favour of “the external self ” (Solms and Panksepp,
2012, p. 174; Solms, 2013, p. 16). One explanation for this subtle
shift might be that the circumscribed equation of the ego with
“the declarative self ” and its associated memory capacity was
deemed too limiting. Indeed, such a reappraisal may have been
warranted as the original wording implies the following logic:
a) if the declarative self which does not appear to develop before
6 months of age is exclusively concomitant with the ego (as per
a neo-Viennese view), and;
b) the presence of an ego co-occurs with object-relating (as
both the Viennese and the Kleinians maintained during the
Controversial Discussions), then;
c) the infant is necessarily not an egoic object-relating entity
at birth.
However, such a conclusion is arguably not borne out by
the research. As alluded to above, new-borns can and
do exhibit non-declarative priming capacities; they will
“show more robust processing” of their mother’s face
than they do a stranger’s. If such perceptually-driven
priming can be regarded as evidence of object-relating—a
position that arguably has greater logical coherence than
to suggest such behaviour implies auto-eroticism—then
the workings of rudimentary non-declarative memory
may be conceived of as conferring a nascent second-
person perspective, and therein egoic experience of the most
embryonic kind.
The Clinical Material of Infant Observation
Given the developmental period under consideration here,
infant observation data constitutes a natural source of insight.
Moreover, as has been noted by Rustin (2010, p. 382),
psychoanalytic infant observation can be seen to “preserve
several of the attributes of the clinical setting” and, as such, can
be considered a forum for the development of “psychoanalytic
theory and technique,” akin to the traditional consulting room.
A recent contribution to this area of knowledge comes from
a student of Rustin—Wendy Shallcross—who undertook “the
systematic study of a single recorded case of infant observation
using Grounded Theory” (2014, p. 1). As Rustin (2016, p. 188)
points out, himself referencing Anderson (2006), the Grounded
Theory methodology is “well-suited” to infant observation-
based research “because its analytic procedures are so close to
the ‘line by line’ practise of supervision through which they
[child psychotherapists] have previously learned to reflect on the
meanings of clinical material”). It is to this fine-grain analysis of
infant observation that we shall now turn.
Shallcross (2014, p. 28) begins her thesis with an
acknowledgment of the importance placed on attempting
to suspend “possible theoretical explanation or theorization
until analysis of the observational material was complete.” She
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then goes on to depict, both via the raw observational data
and its ultimate analysis, the remarkable sensitivity that the
infant shows towards their environment whilst awake as well
as, strikingly, whilst asleep. Indeed, one of the most notable
features of the recorded observations is how the baby, Kieran,
“although sleeping, registers the to-ing and fro-ing of his mother”
(Shallcross, 2014, p. 74). The following is reported of the second
observation, at which point Kieran was only 10 days old:
The pram was situated opposite the window, diffused light shone
onto Kieran’s face... He lay with his head to the right, lying
predominantly on his back. Kieran shuddered as his mother left
the room. A smile flickered across his face, followed by a sucking
movement and irregular breathing. Kieran’s eyelids continued to
flutter and occasionally became screwed quite tightly, at such times
he looked as though he may be in pain or remembering pain. Susan
returned, she looked into the pram and watched Kieran for a short
while. Kieran’s breathing steadied into a slower rhythm, his body
still and relaxed. (Shallcross, 2014, p. 74)
Whilst this brief excerpt does not constitute conclusive evidence
on its own, Kieran’s sensitivity to his mother’s presence
is representative of his presentation throughout the second
observation and is echoed across many of the 46 observations
that form the basis of Shallcross’ research.What’s more and as the
author herself notes, to have detected this “mental relatedness”
at such an early stage and without the infant even occupying
a waking state represents an “original finding” of some import
(Shallcross, 2014, p. 34).
Further to the study’s raw data, Kieran’s “mental relatedness”
constitutes a discernible feature of the data analysis. This is
recognisable within many of the codes that emerged through the
initial line-by-line coding of written reports and is implicit in a
variety of the overarching thematic clusters that were identified
through the subsequent grouping of these codes (Shallcross,
2014, p. 204–211).2 Clustered themes that emerged through
analysis of the initial four observations from the first month
of Kieran’s life notably include “Immersion” (in the object),
“Orientation” (to the object), and “Transformation” (through the
object) (Shallcross, 2014, p. 204–211). A distinct and compelling
object relational resonance was thus found to exist across much
of the observational data, including that relating to Kieran’s
very earliest days. For Shallcross (2014, p. 28), this apparent
object relating—which, as has been discussed, carries profound
implications for the early ego—was primarily expressed through
the infant’s body; as she writes, “there was observable bodily
organisation and rhythm in the baby’s movements, particularly
so in the presence of mother, which I came to realise indicated
a significant level of integration.” Consequently, having aimed to
suspend premature theorising, Shallcross (2014, p. 28) ultimately
concludes that her “findings are consistent with Melanie Klein’s
account of how object relations are operative from birth.”
2For the original charts produced to “illustrate the clustering process” (see
Shallcross, 2014, p. 207; p. 208; p. 272).
How Can We Understand and Locate
Unconscious Phantasy if the Main Part of
the Mind That Freud Thought of as
Unconscious Is Not so?
We now return to where this paper began: “the nature and
function of phantasy” (Isaacs, 1948, p. 73). However, we can
now bring to bear on that central theme of the Controversial
Discussions the developments detailed in this paper. As was
alluded to in the opening sections, phantasy—that which is
defined by Kleinians as “the psychological corollary of instinct”—
has a cognate co-existence with the ego such that it is not
possible to conceptualise the presence of one without implying
the existence of the other (Bott Spillius et al., 2011, p. 3–
4). The logic underpinning this is that it is through the
medium of phantasy that affects (understood here as instinctual
expressions of the basic emotion systems) are transformed
into object representations: the hallmark of ego function. As
such, affect constitutes the primary propellant of phantasy;
without what Holmes (2020, p. 52), amongst others, describes
as the “bottom-up” influence of core affective consciousness,
“top-down” “psychic representation” (Ogden, 1984, p. 501)
has no raison d’être. Accordingly, the shape of phantasy
is driven both by the valence of affects that invoke it in
the first place, as well as the “plots” around which psychic
representation unfolds. Both these factors will be considered
in turn.
Beginning with the valence of affect, the work of Wilfred
Bion represents an important source of psychoanalytic insight,
in particular his work on the “emotional link.” This concept
involves the understanding that affect invariably constitutes an
integral aspect of any object relation. In Bion’s own words
(Bion, 1962, pp. 42–43), “an emotional experience cannot
be conceived of in isolation from a relationship. The basic
relationships that I postulate are (1) X loves Y; (2) X hates
Y; and (3) X knows Y.” These various emotional links would,
in Bion’s publications from the early 1960s, come to be
referred to as (1) L, (2) H, and (3) K links. One of the
important attributes of Bion’s proposals were that, as Golse
(2019) notes, they went someway “beyond the Freudian model”
of the drives to incorporate the centrality of object relations
within emotional experience. Furthermore, these ideas would
have significant implications for Bion’s understanding of the
clinical encounter, as to comprehend the emotional link of
any given session is, as Symington and Symington (1996, p.
29) write, to discover the “key” to the analytic hour “rather
like the key signature at the commencement of a piece
of music.”
This collection of Bionian ideas—particularly the notion that
“emotional experience cannot be conceived of in isolation from
a relationship”—is highly compatible with an understanding
put forward earlier in this paper in respect of the basic
emotion systems: principally that they are relational drives,
the satisfaction of which routinely depends on objects (in the
psychoanalytic sense) (Solms, 2018, p. 5). In short, within both
the Bionian and the neuropsychoanalytic frame of reference,
emotion is understood to be the essential catalyst of any
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object relation. Moreover, the basic emotion systems that
Panksepp described can arguably add a retrospective layer of
definition to Bion’s theory insofar as these frameworks map
onto each other with remarkable congruence. Without wishing
to reduce the specificity of each of these models, three of
the basic emotions (LUST, CARE, PLAY) might be more
broadly considered L links; three (RAGE, FEAR, PANIC/GRIEF)
could be conceived of as H links; whilst SEEKING bears
a striking resemblance to the K link.3 Bringing together
the language of both frameworks, the valence of affect can
be said to play the fundamental role of infusing psychic
representation with an emotional colour that propels (in ways
that are highly specific to the basic need being activated)
the unfolding link between “X” and “Y.” What’s more, from
the clinical standpoint, the fundamental question that the
neuropsychoanalytic model developed by Solms (2018) urges
therapists to ask—namely what is the patient feeling?—may
reveal sessional keys that harbour the potential to facilitate a
similar level of psychic access to that which Bion envisioned
was enabled through identifying emotional links, as he conceived
of them. Finally, drawing on the neuroanatomical exploration
detailed in the sections above, it can be reasonably hypothesised
that the PAG is likely to play an important part in any such
emotional (and therein intrinsically relational) experience such
as that described.
Turning now to the nature of the top-down plots that affect
fuses into, the writing of Kernberg (1973, p. 364) (which, in
turn, draws heavily on Ronald Fairbairn’s work) is pertinent
to the present discussion; specifically, the conceptualisation
of “self-object-affect units.” In Kernberg’s view, such units
are a product of the ego’s “primary autonomous functions”—
which are said to include perceptual capacities—as well as the
capacity to “introject experiential engrams and dichotomize
them according to valence, positive or negative” (Robbins,
1980, p. 480). Crucially, these introjected units are described
as comprising “the ‘building blocks’ of the psychic apparatus,
which is at first a dual structure” (Robbins, 1980, p. 480, my
emphasis). For the purposes of this discussion, the notion that
the ego functions to inculcate psychological foundations that are
“always already” (Heidegger, 1953, p. 75) of a dual structure
(and that it is doing so “at birth”) (Robbins, 1980, p. 480), is of
clear relevance. Moreover, it can be seen to describe something
fundamental of phantasy: that the psychic representation of affect
unfolds around dyadic plots that are intrinsically structured
as self-object networks (or “X-Y” configurations in Bion’s
aforementioned algebra).
Appropriating Sullivan’s (1896, p. 5) architectural aphorism
that “form ever follows function,” what, we might ask, does
the dyadic format of phantasy reveal about its function?
To consider this, the notion that the basic emotion systems
3Bion would go on to describe “equal, but negative ties for each of the
three links” (Golse, 2019). For example, -H is “not to hate”, which Stokoe
(2020) has aptly described as the re-channelled aggression of “etiquette.” In
a neuropsychoanalytic frame, these minus links might be conceptualised as
“cognitive-affective amalgams” (Panksepp and Watt, 2011, p. 10): “top-down”
modifications of the “bottom-up” basic emotions.
represent relational drives is once again worth re-stating and
under-scoring (Solms, 2018, p. 5). As a result of the basic
biological and relational requirements demanded by these
systems, being equipped with what Hopkins (2016, p. 2) has
evocatively referred to as an “innate virtual reality generator” in
phantasy confers clear evolutionary advantage. In the language
of Friston (2012, p. 248), it is within this “virtual reality”
that we “generate predictions” about how the self (and the
body that the self is felt to reside within) might go about
satisfying its needs in an environment populated with objects.
As might be expected of any effective “predictive model”
(Hopkins, 2016, p. 2), the structure of phantasy thus mirrors
the very format of the world that it is functionally required to
predict. Accordingly, the function of phantasy might be most
readily discerned in its actualised effects on the world that it
predictively relates to; as Golse (2019) observes, the relations
we exhibit constitute external expressions of the affectively
impelled internal links that connect the “virtual” self and object
in phantasy.
A question that remains relates to the unconscious status
that Kleinians ascribe to phantasy, as it could be argued that
what is described above frequently goes on within awareness.
If, however, the ego is, as Solms and Panksepp suggest,
“unconscious in itself ” then arguably its “primary autonomous
functions” (such as the workings of phantasy) may most
appropriately be described in consonant terms as “unconscious”
phenomena. Moreover, returning to an idea expressed in the
discussion of the second question above—that the new-born
infant’s object-relating occurs on a non-declarative level—then,
given the influence that psychoanalysis understands our earliest
experiences to have on our unconscious minds, the non-
declarative level of “top-down” ego function may represent a
particularly germane platform for conceptualising the primary
location of unconscious phantasy. This suggestion is, in fact,
closely aligned with a conclusion that Solms (2017, p. 94)
draws; as he writes in his paper What is “the unconscious,” and
where is it located in the brain?, Freud’s system unconscious
may be localised “in the non-declarative memory systems
located beneath the cortex, primarily in the basal ganglia and
cerebellum.” In consequence, whilst the id may no longer
be a psychic agency with which unconscious phantasy can
plausibly be associated—as, for instance, Ogden (1984, p. 501)
explicitly does—the ego (primarily the non-declarative domain
of ego functioning) does present a neuropsychoanalytically viable
candidate in this respect.
CONCLUSION
Whilst the arguments that split the British Psychoanalytical
Society in the 1940s remain, for many in the psychoanalytic
community, unresolved, adopting an interdisciplinary approach
and drawing on developments from neighbouring fields can
catalyse the generation of fresh perspectives. In particular, the
work of Panksepp and Solms, as well as of others from the
affective and cognitive neurosciences, can be fruitfully brought
to bear on these controversial matters. As has been argued here,
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doing so can reveal renewed justification for aspects of the
Kleinian metapsychology which regards the rudimentary ego,
unconscious phantasy, and the primitive processing of affect via
self-object networks, as intimately linked and ultimately fostered
from the very beginning of life.
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